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Abstract
The way entanglement influences the power of quantum and classical multi-prover in-
teractive proof systems is a long-standing open question. We show that the class of lan-
guages recognized by quantum multi-prover interactive proof systems, QMIP, is equal
to MIP∗, the class of languages recognized by classical multi-prover interactive proof sys-
tems where the provers share entanglement. After the recent result by Jain, Ji, Upad-
hyay and Watrous showing that QIP = IP, our work completes the picture from the ver-
ifier’s perspective by showing that also in the setting of multiple provers with shared en-
tanglement, a quantum verifier is no more powerful than a classical one: QMIP = MIP∗.
Our techniques are based on the adaptation of universal blind quantum computation (a
protocol recently introduced by us) to the context of interactive proof systems. We show
that in the multi-prover scenario, shared entanglement has a positive effect in removing
the need for a quantum verifier. As a consequence, our results show that the entire
power of quantum information in multi-prover interactive proof systems is captured by
the shared entanglement and not by the quantum communication.
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1 Introduction and Related work
An interactive proof system [GMR89, Bab85] consists of an interaction between a computationally
unbounded prover and a computationally bounded probabilistic verifier. The prover attempts to
convince the verifier that a given input string satisfies some property, while the verifier tries to
determine the validity of this proof. A language L is said to have an interactive proof system if
there exists a randomized polynomial-time verifier V such that an honest prover can, with high
probability, convince V to accept when the given input is in L (completeness), and no prover can
convince V to accept with high probability when the input is not in L (soundness). The class of
languages having interactive proof systems is denoted IP. Multi-prover interactive proofs (MIP),
first proposed in [BOGKW88], are the generalization of interactive proofs to the multi-prover sce-
nario. It was shown in [BFL91, FRS94] that MIP = NEXP, paving the way to important results in
inapproximability and probabilistically checkable proofs [FGL+96, AS98, ALM+98].
The quantum analogue of interactive proofs, quantum interactive proofs (QIP), were first intro-
duced by Watrous [Wat99]: they involve a computationally unbounded prover exchanging quantum
messages with a polynomially bounded quantum verifier. Using the powerful techniques of captur-
ing the computational power of quantum interactive proofs by semi-definite programming (SDP),
Kitaev and Watrous showed [KW00] that IP ⊆ QIP = QIP(3) ⊆ EXP (where QIP(k) denotes
a k-message quantum interactive proof). Recently, by employing an efficient parallel algorithm
for SDP, Jain, Ji, Upadhyay and Watrous [JJUW09] solved a long-standing open problem on the
power of quantum interactive proof systems by showing that QIP is contained in PSPACE (since
IP = PSPACE [LFKN90, Sha90] it follows that QIP = IP); this work builds on a previous result
that QIP(2) ⊆ PSPACE [JUW09]. We therefore conclude that quantum information adds no power
to the single-prover interactive proof scenario. The corresponding question regarding the power of
multi-prover quantum interactive proof systems where the provers share prior entanglement but
otherwise cannot communicate, however, remains open.
Quantum interactive proofs with multiple provers (QMIP) were introduced by Kobayashi and
Matsumoto [KM03], where they proved that in the case where provers share no entanglement,
QMIP(n.e.) = MIP and moreover when the provers share at most polynomially many entangled
qubits, QMIP(l.e.) ⊆ NEXP. Several papers have already analyzed both negative and positive as-
pects of sharing entanglement in the context of interactive proofs with multiple provers involving
a quantum verifier (QMIP) or a classical verifier (MIP∗) [CHTW04, KKMV08, KV06] and yet the
question of how entanglement influences the power of such proof systems has not been answered:
since entanglement can potentially increase both the completeness and soundness error, it is not
even clear whether the expressive power of either QMIP or MIP∗ is a subset or superset of, or is
incomparable to NEXP.
Hence one could hope for a breakthrough using fresh techniques for a full understanding of the
expressive power of quantum multi-prover interactive proofs with provers sharing an unlimited
amount of entanglement. This paper presents a step forward in this direction: based on a novel
approach connecting a cryptographic protocol with interactive proof systems, we show that a quan-
tum verifier is no more powerful than a classical verifier even in the multi-party scenario, and hence
that QMIP = MIP∗.
2 Summary of Contributions and Techniques
Recently Jain, Ji, Upadhyay and Watrous [JJUW09] obtained the surprising result that quantum
interactive proof systems and classical interactive proof systems have equivalent expressive power,
proving that QIP = IP. Using a different approach based on a cryptographic protocol, we prove the
analogue of this result in the context of multiple provers with shared entanglement, to demonstrate
that quantum computing adds no power to interactive proof systems even with multiple provers:
QMIP = MIP∗. More precisely, we show that for any number k of provers, QMIP[k] = MIP∗[k]
(the case k = 1 following from [JJUW09]). Our proof is heavily based on the usage of shared
entanglement which can be seen as another positive aspect of shared entanglement in the multi-
prover scenario.
Our techniques are based on the adaptation of universal blind quantum computation [BFK09]
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(a protocol recently introduced by us) to the context of interactive proof systems. We have al-
ready used this method to show that any language in BQP has an entangled two-prover interactive
proof system requiring a verifier performing only randomized polynomial-time classical computa-
tion and provers performing polynomial-time quantum computation. Similarly, we show in this
work how to use the shared entanglement between computationally unbounded provers to reduce
the requirement of the verifier in a multi-prover quantum interactive proof system to purely clas-
sical computation, without reducing the expressive power of the interactive proof system. The
connection between interactive proof system and blind quantum computation was first studied by
Aharonov, Ben-Or and Eban [ABE10], however it remains an open question whether their setting
can yield a multi-prover interactive proof system with a purely classical verifier, which is what we
require for our construction.
Informally speaking, a protocol P for a language L in QMIP consists of several rounds where the
verifier receives a quantum message from each prover which she processes to generate the next set of
quantum messages to be sent to the provers. One can use the blind quantum computation protocol
between the verifier and entangled provers to remove this need for the verifier to exchange and
process quantum information with the provers. In order to run a quantum circuit, she enlists the
help of two entangled provers, P1 and P2. P1 first receives authenticated and encrypted quantum
messages teleported [BBC+93] from the other provers (the special case of authenticating P1’s own
message is also covered), and then the two-server blind quantum computation protocol is executed
with P1 and P2, so that P1 eventually computes the next set of messages. These messages are re-
distributed (via teleportation) to all other provers, with the help of whom the verifier then verifies
the authenticity of the messages. Note that we use a loose definition of teleportation, referring to
the special case where the verifier controls the classical communication between provers since in
our protocol, there is no direct communication between provers. Moreover, using encryption and
an authentication code, the verifier can do away with her need to store a local quantum register
between rounds by using P1’s memory. The blindness property guarantees that no information is
leaked to the provers, as though the verifier herself is running the quantum circuits. Repeating
this process, we simulate P with a protocol requiring only a classical verifier, thus showing that
L ∈ MIP∗. The overhead cost of such action is the usage of a linear (in the size of the verifier’s
quantum circuits) number of copies of entangled states |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉) and polynomial
classical communication. We prove that the completeness is unchanged and that the soundness
error can be bounded arbitrary close to the original value.
3 Preliminaries
We assume that the reader is familiar with the quantum formalism, including the quantum circuit
model and measurement-based quantum computing (MBQC) [RB01, RBB03, DKP07]. This sec-
tion reviews the model of quantum multi-prover interactive proof systems and sketches the blind
quantum computation protocol.
We use the definition and notation defined in the earlier work of Kempe, Kobayashi, Matsumoto
and Vidick [KKMV08]. A quantum k-prover interactive proof system consists of a verifier V with
private quantum register V (with one qubit designated as the output qubit) and k provers P1, . . . , Pk
with private quantum registers P1, . . . ,Pk, as well as quantum message registers M1, . . . ,Mk. At
the beginning of the protocol, all the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk) are initialized to |0 . . . 0〉, and the
qubits in (P1, . . . ,Pk) are in some shared state, |Φ〉, prepared by the provers in advance (and hence
possibly entangled). No communication between the provers is allowed after the preparation of
this state. The protocol consists of alternating turns of the provers and of the verifier, starting
with the verifier, if m is even, and with the provers otherwise. During the turn of the verifier, V
applies some polynomial-time circuit to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk), and then sends each message
register Mi to prover Pi. During the turn of the provers, each Pi applies some transformation to
the registers (Pi,Mi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and sends Mi back to the verifier. The last turn is always
a turn for the provers. After the last turn, the verifier applies a polynomial-time circuit to the
qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk), and then measures the output qubit in the standard basis, accepting if
the outcome is |1〉 and rejecting otherwise.
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Formally, anm-turn polynomial-time quantum verifier V for k-prover QMIP system is a polynomial-
time computable mapping from input strings x to a set of polynomial-time uniformly gener-
ated circuits {V 1, . . . , V d(m+1)/2e}, and a partition of the space on which they act into registers
(V,M1, . . . ,Mk), which consist of polynomially many qubits. Similarly, an m-turn quantum prover
P is a mapping from x to a set of circuits {P 1, . . . , P d(m+1)/2e} each acting on registers (Pi,Mi). No
restrictions are placed on the complexity of this mapping or the size of Pi, however, the provers are
limited by the linearity of quantum mechanics. Note that in our setting, circuits V i and P i might
include measurements (e.g. a measurement pattern) and implement a general completely positive
trace preserving map, and not just a unitary operator, however this is equivalent to the standard
setting [AKN98, RBB03].
The protocol (V, P1, . . . , Pk, |Φ〉) is the alternating application of provers’ and verifier’s circuits
to the state |0 . . . 0〉 ⊗ |Φ〉 in registers (V,M1, . . . ,Mk,P1, . . . ,Pk). We say that (V, P1, . . . , Pk, |Φ〉)
accepts x if the designated output qubit in V is measured in |1〉 at the end of the protocol and call
the probability with which this happens pacc(x, V, P1, . . . , Pk, |Φ〉).
Definition 1. A language L is in QMIP(k,m, c, s) if there exists an m-turn polynomial-time quan-
tum verifier V for quantum k-prover interactive proof systems such that, for every input x:
(Completeness) if x ∈ L, there exist m-turn quantum provers P1, . . . , Pk and a shared state |Φ〉
such that pacc(x, V, P1, . . . , Pk, |Φ〉) ≥ c,
(Soundness) if x 6∈ L, for any m-turn quantum provers P ′1, . . . , P ′k and any shared state |Φ′〉,
pacc(x, V, P
′
1, . . . , P
′
k, |Φ′〉) ≤ s. (We refer to s as the soundness error.)
We can similarly define an entangled k-prover interactive proof system (MIP∗) to be a quantum
k-prover interactive proof system where the verifier’s private and message registers are classical,
and with the unbounded provers performing quantum computations and having access to shared
entanglement. Hence an m-turn polynomial-time classical verifier V for a k-prover MIP∗ system
is a polynomial-time computable mapping from input strings x to a set of polynomial-time uni-
formly generated classical circuits {V 1, . . . , V d(m+1)/2e}, and a partition of the space on which they
act into registers (V,M1, . . . ,Mk), which consist of polynomially many classical bits. An m-turn
quantum prover P is a mapping from x to a set of circuits {P 1, . . . , P d(m+1)/2e}, each acting on
registers (Mi,Pi). Circuits V
i and P i might employ private randomness. At the beginning of the
protocol, all the bits in (M1, . . . ,Mk) are initialized to zero, and the qubits in (P1, . . . ,Pk) are in
some shared state, |Φ〉, prepared by the provers in advance (and hence possibly entangled). The
remaining definition are exactly the same as for QMIP.
Next we briefly discuss the universal blind quantum computation protocol (UBQC) [BFK09]
which will be used in the proof of our main result. Suppose Alice has in mind a unitary op-
erator U that is implemented with a pattern on a fixed but universal graph state with (X,Y )
measurements with angles given as multiples of pi/4. This pattern could have been designed either
directly in MBQC or from a circuit construction. Alice does not have the full quantum power to
implement U , and wishes to use Bob as a resource to do so, while maintaining the privacy of her
computation, meaning that Bob does not learn anything about the computation that he is helping
Alice perform (except an upper bound on the dimensions of her circuit). Following [BFK09], we
say that such a protocol is blind if Bob’s view of the protocol does not depend on Alice’s input
(X), when given an upper bound on the dimensions of her circuit (Y ); since his view consists of
classical and quantum information, this means that the distribution of the classical information
does not depend on X (given Y ) and that for any fixed choice of the classical information, the
state of the quantum system is uniquely determined and does not depend on X (given Y ). We will
subsequently refer to this property as blindness.
There are two stages to the protocol: preparation and computation. In the preparation stage,
Alice prepares single qubits chosen randomly from { 1√
2
(|0〉+ eiθ |1〉) | θ = 0, pi/4, 2pi/4, . . . , 7pi/4}
and sends them to Bob. After receiving all the qubits, Bob entangles them according to the uni-
versal brickwork state [BFK09]. The computation stage involves interaction: for each layer of the
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brickwork state, for each qubit, Alice sends a classical message to Bob to tell him in what basis of
the (X,Y ) plane he should measure the qubit. Bob performs the measurement and communicates
the outcome; Alice’s choice of angles in future rounds will depend on these values. Importantly,
Alice’s quantum states and classical messages are astutely chosen so that, no matter what Bob
does, he cannot infer anything about her measurement pattern. If Alice is computing a classical
function, the protocol finishes when all the qubits are measured. If she is computing a quantum
function, Bob returns to her the final qubits. A modification of the protocol also allows Alice’s
inputs to be quantum. An authentication mechanism is provided; this allows Alice to ascertain
that Bob has followed her instructions.
One can view the UBQC protocol as an interactive proof system for any language in BQP where
Alice acts as the verifier and Bob as the prover [BFK09, ABE10]. Moreover, the protocol can be
adapted to the setting of a purely classical verifier who communicates classically with two noncom-
municating entangled provers, in order to perform a blind quantum computation [BFK09]. In this
scenario, the general idea is for one prover to be used to prepare the random qubits that would have
been generated by Alice in the original protocol, while the other prover is used for universal blind
quantum computation. Our main technique is the extension of this view in order to substitute a
quantum verifier in a protocol for QMIP with a purely classical one.
4 Contribution
4.1 Definitions
The main step in our construction is to design an interactive protocol with only classical commu-
nication that replaces a turn for the verifier in a given quantum interactive proof system: the new
protocol requires only classical resources for the verifier. The next definition captures this notion.
Definition 2. A k-party delegated quantum computation is any protocol which accepts quan-
tum input states stored in message registers Mi in Hilbert space Mi from each of k provers Pi, and
classical input CV from a verifier V , where CV represents the classical description of a quantum
circuit of size polynomial in log (
∏
i dim(Mi)). After CV is applied to (M1, . . . ,Mk), the protocol
returns to each prover Pi the register Mi and returns y to V , where y is the classical result of
measurements performed on any ancillary qubits introduced by V in CV . The provers may share
prior entanglement, but are not allowed to communicate during the protocol. Furthermore, commu-
nication between individual provers and the verifier is purely classical, and the verifier is restricted
to performing randomized polynomial-time classical computation.
In order to provide a full simulation of the quantum verifier, we require that our protocol have
certain properties as formalized in the next few definitions. At first glance, some of these properties
may seem stronger than what would be required; we expand on this in Section 4.2.
Definition 3. A k-party delegated quantum computation is efficient if:
• Given CV , the description of V can be computed in time polynomial in O((
∏
i dim(Mi));• V ’s computation runs in time polynomial in O((∏i dim(Mi)).
For a k-party delegated quantum computation, we define the result of the computation to be y
together with the final state of message registers (M1, . . . ,Mk).
Definition 4. A k-party delegated quantum computation is authenticated with parameter δ if there
exists a bit y0 ∈ {pass, fail} in y such that:
• if all parties follow the protocol, y0 = pass;
• if one or more provers interfere with the protocol then either:
– their actions fail to alter the result of the computation and y0 = pass; or
– their actions alter the result of the computation, and except with probability at most 2−δ, they
are detected, with y0 = fail, indicating alteration.
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In Definition 6, we give a notion of privacy in terms of a black-box functionality (defined below)
for a multi-party delegated computation. Informally speaking, a private protocol will not leak any
information to provers and hence such a protocol can be used for the simulation of a protocol
for QMIP.
Definition 5. A k-party circuit evaluation black-box is a functionality which accepts quantum
input states from each of k provers Pi stored in message registers Mi and classical input CV from
a verifier V , where CV represents the classical description of a quantum circuit. The black-box
returns to each prover Pi the register Mi after applying CV to (M1, . . . ,Mk).
In the next definition, we use the notion of circuit dimensions to represent the depth and the
width of the circuit.
Definition 6. Let P be a k-party delegated quantum computation and B to be the k-party circuit
evaluation black-box. For both P and B, let the verifier’s input be any arbitrary circuit CV and
the provers’ input be any states stored in M1, . . . ,Mk. We say P is private if the distribution of
information obtainable by any malicious prover Pi in P is dependent only on the dimensions of CV
and on the distribution of information obtainable by Pi in B.
As defined in Section 3, in a quantum interactive proof system, the verifier has a private quan-
tum register V, however such a scenario is not captured in our definition of a multi-party delegated
quantum computation. The next lemma removes the requirement of quantum memory for the
verifier during the provers’ turns. In our construction, we also do away with the private quantum
register V during each turn of the verifier: this is explained as part of the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. Given any L ∈ QMIP(k,m, c, s), there exists an interactive proof system for L where
the verifier does not require quantum memory during the provers’ turns and only the soundness
error changes to s′ ≤ max{s, }, for any fixed  > 0.
Proof. In order to remove the requirement of quantum memory, at the end of her turn, the verifier
encrypts and authenticates her quantum register V and sends it to one of the provers and asks
him to return them with his message in the next turn. Both encryption and authentication can
be achieved by applying a random error correcting code (e.g. [BCG+02]), where the verifier only
needs to store a classical key. In this way, only the soundness error might be affected: since the
probability of not detecting a cheating player in the authentication protocol is bounded by some 
which is exponentially small in the security parameter, we have s′ ≤ max{s, }.
4.2 Main Result
As classical information processing is a special case of quantum information processing, trivially
MIP∗ ⊆ QMIP; we prove the reverse inclusion by showing how a multi-party delegated quantum
computation can replace the required quantum power of the verifier in a protocol for QMIP with
only classical computing.
There are two steps to our main result. First, we show in Theorem 1 that if an efficient, authen-
ticated and private k-party delegated quantum computation exists, then QMIP ⊆ MIP∗. Then, we
show in Protocol 1 how to instantiate such a k-party delegated quantum computation protocol and
prove that it satisfies these requirements in Theorem 2. More intuition on Protocol 1 is given after
the proof of Theorem 1.
As mentioned, we have imposed some conditions on the k-party delegated quantum computation
protocol in Theorem 1 that are stronger than may seem necessary. We now elaborate on this. First
of all, in a given protocol for QMIP, the verifier’s circuits are public. Thus, our privacy definition
would seem to be stronger than what is necessary as only the verifier’s private register V needs to be
hidden (we also must ensure that the protocol does not provide a covert means of communication
between provers). However, for our instantiation of the k-party delegated quantum computation
protocol, the authentication property heavily relies on this strong definition of privacy; so does the
construction that sees P1 manipulate the encrypted version of the verifier’s private register V and of
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the other provers’ message registers. Secondly, the authentication definition seems stronger than re-
quired: all we would really need to guarantee is that the result that is returned to the verifier, y, be
correct. However, also due to the construction that sees P1 manipulate the encrypted and authenti-
cated version of the verifier’s private register V, we must have that not just y, but the register in P1’s
hands be authenticated at each iteration of the k-party delegated quantum computation protocol.
Theorem 1. If there exists a k-party delegated quantum computation protocol which is efficient,
authenticated (with parameter δ) and private then QMIP(k,m, c, s) ⊆ MIP∗(k,m′, c, s′), where
s′ ≤ max{s, 2−δ} and the number of turns m′ is polynomially bounded in the input size |x|.
Proof. Recall that by Lemma 1, it is sufficient to consider a verifier with no quantum memory
during the provers’ turns (the only consequence being a potential modification of the soundness
error; this is addressed below).
Without loss of generality, we assume that the interaction begins with a turn of the provers.
Hence the interactive proof can be broken down into a number of rounds polynomial in the input
size, where in each round j:
1. Each prover applies a quantum circuit to prepare the new state of message register Mi.
2. Each prover Pi transmits his message register Mi to the verifier.
3. The verifier performs a computation described by circuit V j on (V,M1, . . . ,Mk).
4. The verifier transmits the message register Mi to each prover Pi.
We wish to use P, a k-party delegated quantum computation protocol, to perform the computa-
tion and message preparation required by steps 2–4. However, P requires a fully classical verifier.
Even with the application of Lemma 1, we must still deal with the verifier’s quantum register V in
Step 3. The solution is for the register V to always remain with P1 in an encrypted and authen-
ticated form: V adjusts her circuits to add the encryption and authentication at the end of the
circuit V j , leaving the encrypted and authenticated register V with P1, and then circuit V
j+1 is
adapted so that it acts on the encrypted and authenticated register.
Using the above construction, we may now use P to perform the computation and message
preparation required by steps 2–4 above, yielding a verifier performing only classical randomized
polynomial-time computation, and hence a protocol in MIP∗ (we specify that if y0 = fail for any call
to P, the verifier rejects). It remains to show that the parameters are as indicated in the statement
of Theorem 1.
Clearly, the number k of provers is unchanged. Note that P is efficient, since the verifier’s strat-
egy can be computed in polynomial-time, runs in polynomial time, and requires only polynomial
communication. Hence the resulting protocol still has a polynomial number of turns, leading to m′
being polynomially bounded in the input size |x|.
To see that the completeness parameter, c, is unchanged, note that if x ∈ L, and the honest
provers follow the protocol (including calls to P), the verifier will accept with probability c as calls
to P always produce the correct state of the message registers.
Finally, the soundness error, s, is affected by the following:
1. By Lemma 1, (and setting  = 2−δ), the soundness error for the protocol with a memoryless
verifier is ≤ max{s, 2−δ}. This is consistent also with the use of  = 2−δ as a security parameter
for the authentication of V.
2. Since P is private, the distribution of information gained from P by any cheating prover Pi is
no more than that obtained through a black-box functionality and circuit width and depth of
the verifier’s computation. This is no more than what is obtainable in the original interactive
proof, as in an interactive proof the verifier’s circuit dimensions are known. Furthermore, note
that our black-box definition of privacy precludes any leaking of information (other than circuit
dimensions) during sequential composition, and calls to P are independent. Hence cheating
provers cannot exploit calls to P to increase the soundness error.
3. Since P is authenticated, any deviation from the computation V j leads to the verifier rejecting
(since y0 = fail), except with probability exponentially small in the security parameter δ.
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The soundness error of the final protocol is independently affected by 1–3 above; this leads to
the soundness error for the final protocol satisfying s′ ≤ max{s, 2−δ}.
We now explicitly formulate a k-party delegated quantum computation and show that the pro-
tocol satisfies the conditions of efficiency, authentication and privacy required by Theorem 1. As
outlined in Section 2, the idea behind our construction, given in Protocol 1, is to use the blind
quantum computation protocol [BFK09] between the verifier and entangled provers to remove the
need for the verifier to exchange and process quantum information.
In order to run a quantum circuit, the verifier enlists the help of two entangled provers, P1 and
P2. P1 first receives authenticated and encrypted message registers Mi teleported from the other
provers (the special case of authenticating P1’s own message register is also covered), and then
the two-server blind quantum computation protocol is executed with P1 and P2: P2 helps prepare
the required initial qubits for the UBQC protocol by performing measurements on his share of the
entangled states, while P1 performs the actual blind computation, eventually computing the final
states of the encrypted message registers. These registers are re-distributed (via teleportation) to
all other provers, who then verify their authenticity with the help of the verifier.
The input message preparation protocol (Protocol 2) accomplishes two things: it transfers all of
the provers’s quantum message registers to P1, and also encrypts and authenticates them so that
no prover can extract any information, any tampering will be detected and the authentication is
compatible with the UBQC protocol. The authentication consists of the verifier instructing the
provers to encode their message qubits into an error correcting code, telling them which trap qubits
to insert (these are qubits that are in a known eigenstate of a Pauli operator), and how to permute
the resulting states. The provers perform a teleportation measurement involving their system and
the shared entanglement with P1, but instead of revealing the measurement result to P1, they send
it to the verifier: this action transfers their encrypted message register to P1. There is an extra
step for Prover P2 since he is involved later on in the preparation of the initial states for the blind
protocol: the position of trap qubits inserted by prover P2 in his message register should become
hidden to him even after they are teleported to prover P1, this is done in Step 4 in Protocol 2. A
similar issue is valid for P1’s own message register: Step 5 in Protocol 2 involves P2 who applies an
additional permutation to P1’s message register so that the position of the trap qubits remains hid-
den to both P1 and P2. On top of this, all qubits in message registers receive random Z-rotations;
these are necessary in order for the inputs to be compatible with the UBQC protocol (Protocol 4).
At this point, the verifier, together with P1 and P2, execute the UBQC with entangled servers
protocol (Protocol 4 in the Appendix), where the encoding and authentication is already performed,
and where P1 provides a quantum input. More explicitly, Protocol 4 is an adaptation of the au-
thenticated UBQC protocol with quantum input and output to the entangled servers scenario. The
full protocol is a simple consequence of our previous result [BFK09].
The output message distribution protocol, Protocol 3, consists of sending the appropriate encoded
quantum message register computed by prover P1 to provers Pi for verification and decryption. The
authentication in our protocol ensures that both P1 and P2 are performing the required operations;
it also ensures that P1 has sent the correct message registers to each Pi. In order to do so, the ver-
ifier instructs each prover to make several Pauli measurements over specific qubits. Note that due
to blindness of Protocol 4 and initial random permutation, the provers have no information about
the location and the state of the returned trap qubits. Furthermore, the returned qubits from P1
are all one-time padded since the result of the teleportation measurements are known only to the
verifier. Hence Protocol 3 reveals at most the new location of trap qubits of each prover Pi which
is of course independent of the state of the message registers and hence the obtained protocol is
authenticated and private. This is formalized in Theorem 2. The blindness property of Protocol 4
guarantees that no information is leaked to the provers, as if V herself is running the quantum
circuits. The overhead cost of such action is the usage of a number of copies of |Φ+〉 linear in the
size of the verifier’s quantum circuits and polynomially many classical messages.
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Protocol 1 k-Prover Delegated Quantum Computation Protocol
1. Using Protocol 2, the input message registers of all provers are encoded, encrypted and
transferred to prover P1.
2. The verifier uses P1 and P2 and executes the Authenticated UBQC with Entangled Provers
with Quantum Input and Output Protocol (Protocol 4 in the Appendix) with the encoded
message registers received by P1 in Step 1 (with keys k
X and kZ as defined in Protocol 2).
3. Using Protocol 3, the message registers resulting from the computation in Step 2 are distributed
and verified.
Protocol 2 Input Message Preparation Protocol
1. The verifier chooses C, where C is some nC-qubit error-correcting code with distance dC. The
security parameter is δ = dC.
2. For each prover Pi, for each qubit j in message register Mi:
(a) The verifier instructs Pi to encode qubit j using C.
(b) The verifier instructs Pi to prepare 3nC qubits in eigenstates of Pauli operators chosen
uniformly at random by the verifier. We refer to these as trap qubits and we refer to the
trap qubits and the qubits used in the error-correcting code collectively as a block.
(c) The verifier instructs Pi to apply a random permutation pii,j to the block.
(d) The verifier instructs each Pi except P1 to apply to each qubit k a random Z-rotation,
Z(θk), with θk ∈ {0, pi/4, 2pi/4, . . . , 7pi/4}, independently chosen for each qubit.
3. Each prover Pi except P1 uses the teleportation protocol to transmit their entire quantum
message register to P1 but communicates the measurement results only to the verifier.
4. For each block j, the verifier instructs P1 to apply a permutation pi
′
2,j to the qubits containing
the result of the teleportation from P2.
5. For each block j of prover P1:
(a) P1 uses the teleportation protocol to transmit his 4nC qubits to P2 but communicates the
measurement results only to the verifier.
(b) The verifier instructs P2 to apply a permutation pi
′
1,j to the qubits containing the result
of the teleportation from P1. The verifier also instructs P2 to apply to each qubit k of the
system a random Z-rotation in Z(θk), θk ∈ {0, pi/4, 2pi/4, . . . , 7pi/4}, independently chosen
for each qubit.
(c) P2 uses the teleportation protocol to return the 4nC qubits to P1 but communicates the
measurement results only to the verifier.
Note that for each qubit, the verifier can now take into account all the received teleportation results
as well as the Z(θk) rotations, to compute the X operation and Z-rotation that has been applied to
the original message registers. Let these values be kXj ∈ {0, 1} and kZj ∈ {0, pi/4, 2pi/4, . . . , 7pi/4}.
Theorem 2. Protocol 1 is a k-party delegated quantum computation which is efficient, authenti-
cated (with parameter δ) and private for all k ≥ 2.
Proof. If all parties follow Protocol 1, the outcome is correct; this follows from the correctness of
the UBQC protocol. In particular, Protocols 2 and 3 serve only to encode and decode the input
states for use in blind quantum computation (Protocol 4 in the Appendix); no information is lost
during either of these stages, and so the correctness relies only on the correctness of Protocol 4
(see the Appendix). Additionally, Protocol 1 is efficient since our construction is polynomial-time
computable and the verifier runs in time polynomial in O (
∏
i dim(Mi)).
To show that Protocol 1 is private, we construct a set of simulators {S1, . . . ,Sk} (see Figure 1).
Each simulator Si interacts with Pi, simulating all other participants. As Si simulates all par-
ticipants except Pi, this implies that Si shares entanglement with Pi (as Pj , j 6= i would) and
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Protocol 3 Output Message Distribution and Verification Protocol
1. For each prover Pi 6= P1, the verifier instructs P1 to apply a permutation pi′′i,j to each block j
and then teleport the 4ninC qubits of message register Mi to Pi. The measurement results are
communicated only to the verifier.
2. The verifier instructs Pi to measure each of the trap qubits in their correct basis.
3. Pi returns the measurement results of the trap qubits to the verifier.
4. If the verifier receives the expected measurement results for each of the trap qubits, she sets
y0 = pass. If a mismatch is found, she sets y0 = fail.
5. If y0 = pass, for each Pi:
(a) The verifier sends Pi the one-time pad key (coming from Step 1 above and from the UBQC
with entangled servers protocol), and all permutations applied to their qubits.
(b) Pi decrypts and decodes their message register.
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other participant’s inputs, but instead has access to a single use of a black box Bi that takes as
input a single quantum register Mi, and calls the k-party circuit evaluation black-box B with fixed
inputs in registersMj for all j != i, corresponding to the contents of registersMj in the protocol, as
well as the classical description of CV corresponding to V ’s input. Si also has access to the circuit
dimensions of CV . Bi calls the k-party circuit evalu tion black-box B, outputing only register Mi
to Si (again, see Figure 1). We show that no Pi can distinguish between an execution of the real
protocol and an execution of the protocol with Si. It follows that the protocol is private since this
proves that the distribution of information obtainable in Protocol 1 is dependent only on the circuit
dimensions of CV and on the distribution of information obtainable by Pi in B (since otherwise
Si would not be indistinguishable). Note that we consider here perfect indistinguishability for a
computationally unbounded Pi and that we make no restrictions on Pi’s a priori knowledge.
In what follows, we assume that Si and Pi share the same entangled states as Pi would share
with other provers Pj (j != i) in a real execution of the protocol. Recall that in the protocol, all
communication is classical and is between Pi and V , hence this is the only communication that Si
must simulate.
First, we consider the case for i ≥ 3 and give a description for Si. In Protocol 1, the involvement
of Pi is limited, as Pi simply teleports his authenticated and encrypted input registers to P1 (Pro-
tocol 2) and later receive his answer register encoded in a similar fashion (Protocol 3). Thus the
strategy for Si is, following the same format as in Step 2 of Protocol 2, to instruct Pi to encode and
encrypt his quantum input register according to a random key chosen by Si, to receive (Step 3 of
Protocol 2) the state by teleportation via the entanglement that Pi would normally share with P1,
but that Si is actually sharing with Pi. Si then decodes the state (recall that Si knows the key as
well as the teleportation bits). This state is used as the input into the black-box Bi. The output is
then re-encoded in a manner consistent with what is used in Protocol 3 and teleported back to Pi
for verification (again, all of this according to Protocol 3). Clearly, from the point of view of Pi,
his interaction with Si is indistinguishable from his interaction with the real protocol.
A similar strategy works for S2: the input and output registers are dealt with as above, with
P2’s input register used as input in the black-box B2. Again, the output is also re-encoded and
returned to P2 as above. Additionally, in Step 5 of Protocol 2, S2 asks P2 to apply a random
permutation to a system that remains encrypted from P2’s point of view. This is indistinguishable
from P1’s real input due to the quantum one-time pad applied by the teleportation, and thus S2
need only provide P2 with the completely mixed state. S2 asks P2 to apply random Z-rotations, as
in Step 5 of Protocol 2. Furthermore, P2 is involved in Step 2 of Protocol 1, which calls Protocol 4
in the Appendix. For Protocol 4, since S2 knows the dimensions of the circuit, he can choose the
dimensions n and m of the brickwork state accordingly. As for P2’s involvement in Step 2 of Pro-
tocol 4, he is asked to measure his part of
∣∣Φ+x,y〉 in |±θ˜x,y〉 as usual, the difference being that the
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other participant’s inputs, but instead has access to a single use of a black box Bi that takes as
input a single quantum register Mi, and calls the k-party circuit evaluation black-box B with fixed
inputs in registersMj for all j != i, corresponding t the contents of registersMj in the protocol, as
well as the classical description of CV corresponding to V ’s input. Si also has access to the circuit
dimensions of CV . Bi calls the k-party circuit evaluation black-box B, outputing only register Mi
to Si (again, see Figure 1). We show that no Pi can distinguish between an execution of the real
protocol and an execution of the protocol with Si. It follows that the protocol is private since this
proves that the distribution of information obtainable in Protocol 1 is dependent only on the circuit
dimensions of CV and on the distribution of information obtainable by Pi in B (since otherwise
Si would not be indistinguishable). Note that we consider here perfect indistinguishability for a
computationally unbounded Pi and that w make no restri tions on Pi’s a priori knowledge.
In what follows, we assume that Si and Pi share the same entangled states as Pi would share
with other provers Pj (j != i) in a real execution of the protocol. Recall that in the protocol, all
communication is classical and is between Pi and V , hence this is the only communication that Si
must simulate.
First, we consider the case for i ≥ 3 and give a description for Si. In Protocol 1, the involvement
of Pi is limited, as Pi simply teleports his authenticated and encrypted input registers to P1 (Pro-
tocol 2) and later receive his answer register encoded in a similar fashion (Protocol 3). Thus the
strategy for Si is, fol owing the same format as in Step 2 of Pr tocol 2, to instruct Pi to e code and
encrypt his quantum input register according to a random key chosen by Si, to receive (Step 3 of
Protocol 2) the state by teleportation via the entanglement that Pi would normally share with P1,
but that Si is actually sharing with Pi. Si then decodes the state (recall that Si knows the key as
well as the teleportation bits). This state is used as the input into the black-box Bi. The output is
then re-encoded in a manner consistent with what is used in Protocol 3 and teleported back to Pi
for verification (again, all of this according to Protocol 3). Clearly, from the point of view of Pi,
his interaction with Si is indistinguishable from his interaction with the real protocol.
A similar strategy works for S2: the input and output registers are dealt with as above, with
P2’s input register used as input in the black-box B2. Again, the output is also re-encoded and
returned to P2 as above. Additionally, in Step 5 of Protocol 2, S2 asks P2 to apply a random
permutation to a system that remains encrypted from P2’s point f view. This is indistinguishable
from P1’s real input due to the quantum one-time pad applied by the teleportation, and thus S2
need only provide P2 with the completely mixed state. S2 asks P2 to apply random Z-rotations, as
in Step 5 of Protocol 2. Furthermore, P2 is involved in Step 2 of Protocol 1, which calls Protocol 4
in the Appendix. For Protocol 4, since S2 knows the dimensions of the circuit, he can choose the
dimensions n and m of the brickwork state accordingly. As for P2’s involvement in Step 2 of Pro-
tocol 4, he is asked to measure his part of
∣∣Φ+x,y〉 in |±θ˜x,y〉 as usual, the difference being that the
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Protocol 2 Input Message Preparation Protocol
1. The verifier chooses C, where C is some nC-qubit error-correcting code with distance dC. The
security parameter is δ = dC.
2. For each prover Pi, for each qubit j in message register Mi:
(a) The verifier instructs Pi to encode qubit j using C.
(b) The verifier instructs Pi to prepare 3nC qubits in eigenstates of Pauli operators chosen
uniformly at random by the verifier. We refer to these as trap qubits and we refer to the
trap qubits and the qubits used in the error-correcting code collectively as a block.
(c) The verifier instructs Pi to apply a random permutation pii,j to the block.
(d) The verifier instructs each Pi except P1 to apply to each qubit j a random Z-rotation in
Z(θj), θj ∈ {0,pi/4, 2pi/4, . . . , 7pi/4}, independently chosen for each qubit.
3. Each prover Pi except P1 uses the teleportation protocol to transmit their entire quantum
message register to P1 but communicates the measurement results only to the verifier.
4. For each block j, the verifier instructs P1 to apply a permutation pi
′
2,j to the qubits containing
the result of the teleportation from P2.
5. For each qubit block of prover P1:
(a) P1 uses the teleportation protocol to transmit his 4nC qubits to P2 but communicates the
measurement results only to the verifier.
(b) The verifier instructs P2 to apply a permutation pi
′
1 to the qubits containing the result of
the teleportation from P1. The verifier also instructs P2 to apply to each qubit j of the
system a random Z-rotation in Z(θj), θj ∈ {0,pi/4, 2pi/4, . . . , 7pi/4}, independently chosen
for each qubit.
(c) P2 uses the teleportation protocol to return the 4nC qubits to P1 but communicates the
measurement results only to the verifier.
Note that for each qubit, the verifier can now take into account all the received teleportation results
as well as the Z(θj) rotations, to compute the X operation and Z-rotation that has been applied to
the original message registers. Let these values be kXj ∈ {0, 1} and kZj ∈ {0,pi/4, 2pi/4, . . . , 7pi/4}.
Protocol 3 Output Message Distribution and Verification Protocol
1. For each prover Pi "= P1, the verifier instructs P1 to apply a permutation pi′′i,j to each block j
and then teleport the 4ninC qubits of message register Mi to Pi. The measurement results are
communicated only to the verifier.
2. The verifier instructs Pi to measure each of the trap qubits in their correct basis.
3. Pi retur s the measurement results of the trap qubits to the verifier.
4. If the verifier receives the expected measurement results for each of the trap qubits, she sets
y0 = pass. If a mismatch is found, she sets y0 = fail.
5. If y0 = pass, for each Pi:
(a) The verifier sends Pi the one-time pad key (coming from Step 1 above and from the UBQC
with entangled servers protocol), and all permutations applied to their qubits.
(b) Pi decrypts and decodes their message register.
the ncoding or decoding stages, and so the correctness relies only on the correctness of UBQC.
Additionally, Protocol 1 is efficient since our construction is polynomial-time computable and the
verifier runs in time polynomial in O((
∏
i dim(Mi)).
To show that Protocol 1 is private, we construct a set of simulators {S1,S2, . . . ,Sk} (see Fig-
ure 1). Each simulator S interacts with Pi, simulating all other participants. As Si simulates all
participants except Pi, this implies that Si shares entanglement with Pi (as Pj , j "= i would) and
communicates classically with Pi (as V would). Importantly, Si does not have access to any of the
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P1M1
M1
Figure 1: (a) A k-party delegated quantum computation protocol, with the provers and their
quantum registers M1, . . . ,Mk and the verifier and her classical input CV . (b) A simulation
protocol where simulator S1 simulates all other participants P2, . . . , Pk while sharing entanglement
with P1 and only communicating classically with P1. The simulator also has access to a black
box B1 with input register M1, that calls the k-party circuit evaluation black-box B with fixed
inputs in registers Mj for all j 6= 1 a d CV .
communicates classically with Pi (as V wou d). Importantly, Si does not have access to any of the
other particip nt’s inpu s, but instead has access to a single use of a black box Bi that t kes as
input a single quantum re ister Mi, and calls the k-party circuit evaluation black-box B with fixed
inputs in registers Mj for all j 6= i, corresponding to the contents of registers Mj in the protocol, as
well as the classical description of CV corresponding to V ’s input. Si also has access to the circuit
dimensions of CV . Bi calls the k-party circuit evaluation black-box B, outputing only register Mi
to Si (again, see Figure 1). We show that no Pi can distinguish between an execution of the real
protocol and an execution of the protocol with Si. It follows that the protocol is private since this
proves that the distribution of information obtainable in Protocol 1 is dependent only on the circuit
dimensions of CV and on the distribution of information obtainable by Pi in B (since otherwise
Si would not be indistinguishable). Note that we consider here perfect indistinguishability for a
computationally unbounded Pi and that we make no restrictions on Pi’s a priori knowledge.
In what follows, we assume that Si and Pi share the same entangled states as Pi would share
with ot er pr vers Pj (j 6= i) in a real executi n of the pr tocol. Recall that in the protocol, all
communication is class cal and is between Pi and V , hence this is the only communication that Si
must simulate.
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First, we consider the case for i ≥ 3 and give a description for Si. In Protocol 1, the involvement
of Pi is limited, as Pi simply teleports his authenticated and encrypted input registers to P1 (Pro-
tocol 2) and later receive his answer register encoded in a similar fashion (Protocol 3). Thus the
strategy for Si is, following the same format as in Step 2 of Protocol 2, to instruct Pi to encode and
encrypt his quantum input register according to a random key chosen by Si, to receive (Step 3 of
Protocol 2) the state by teleportation via the entanglement that Pi would normally share with P1,
but that Si is actually sharing with Pi. Si then decodes the state (recall that Si knows the key
as well as the results of the teleportation measurements). This state is used as the input into the
black-box Bi. The output is then re-encoded in a manner consistent with what is used in Protocol 3
and teleported back to Pi for verification. Clearly, from the point of view of Pi, his interaction with
Si is indistinguishable from his interaction with the real protocol.
A similar strategy works for S2: the input and output registers are dealt with as above, with
P2’s input register used as input in the black-box B2. Again, the output is also re-encoded and
returned to P2 as above. Additionally, in Step 5 of Protocol 2, S2 asks P2 to apply a random
permutation to a system that remains encrypted from P2’s point of view. This is indistinguishable
from P1’s real input due to the quantum one-time pad applied by the teleportation, and thus S2
need only provide P2 with the completely mixed state. S2 asks P2 to apply random Z-rotations, as
in Step 5 of Protocol 2. Furthermore, P2 is involved in Step 2 of Protocol 1, which calls Protocol 4
in the Appendix. For Protocol 4, since S2 knows the dimensions of the circuit, he can choose the
dimensions n and m of the brickwork state accordingly. As for P2’s involvement in Step 2 of Pro-
tocol 4, he is asked to measure his part of
∣∣Φ+x,y〉 in |±θ˜x,y〉 as usual, the difference being that the
measurement results mx,y are not used any further. From the point of view of P2, his interaction
with S2 is indistinguishable from his interaction with the real protocol.
To show a strategy for S1, we analyze each step of Protocol 1 separately:
• Step 1. This is a call to Protocol 2. The strategy for S1 is to instruct P1 to encode and encrypt
his quantum input register according to a random key chosen by S1. S1 then receives (Step 5
of Protocol 2) the state by teleportation via the entanglement that P1 would normally share
with P2, but that S1 is actually sharing with P1. S1 then decodes the state (recall that S1 knows
the key as well as the teleportation bits). This state is used as the input into the black-box B1.
• Step 2. Here, Protocol 4 is executed. As above, since S1 knows the dimensions of the circuit,
he can choose the dimensions n and m of the brickwork state accordingly. Due to the blindness
of the UBQC protocol (Protocol 4 in the Appendix), the interaction involved can be simulated
knowing only the circuit dimensions: S1’s strategy for this step is simply to instruct P1 to measure
the brickwork state qubits with random measurement angles. Using this technique, P1 cannot
distinguish between his interaction with the real protocol or with S1.
• Step 3. The output from the black-box Bi is re-encoded (in a manner consistent with what is
used in Protocol 3). S1 then applies a Hadamard gate and subsequent Z rotation to each qubit.
The angle of rotation for each qubit is chosen independently as a random multiple of pi4 . This
system is then teleported to the correct position in the column x = n−1 of the brickwork state via
the entanglement established in Step 1 of Protocol 4. S1 uses the knowledge of P1’s measurement
angles and results in order to use the last layer of the brickwork state to undo the random Z
rotation and Hadamard on each qubit and to establish the one-time pad key on the system.
The verification and decryption procedure is executed according to Protocol 3.
From the point of view of P1, his interaction with S1 is indistinguishable from his interaction with
the real protocol. Thus, as the required set of simulators {S1, . . . ,Sk} exists, Protocol 1 is private.
Finally, to show that Protocol 1 is authenticated, first note that if all parties follow the protocol,
the outcome is correct as discussed above and the verifier sets y0 = pass in Protocol 3 since all trap
qubit verifications succeed. We now show that any non-trivial modification of the result of the
computation leads to y0 = fail, except with exponentially small probability in δ. As no prover has
any information about the layout of the trap qubits (due to random permutation performed in Pro-
tocol 2), the probability of disturbing a trap qubit by Protocol 1 is the same as in Protocol 4. Thus
any interference with the delegated quantum computing protocol by any group of provers can be
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detected due to the authentication property of Protocol 4 (this is based on Theorem 7 of [BFK09]
see also the Appendix). That is to say, in order to create an undetected error, a malicious party
must apply an operator of weight at least δ, but as they do not know the location of the trap qubits,
the probability of applying such an operator without disturbing a trap qubit scales as 2−δ.
Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that from the point of view of the verifier, any devia-
tion by any number of provers in the Input Message Preparation Protocol (Protocol 2) and/or the
Output Message Distribution and Verification Protocol (Protocol 3) is equivalent to a deviation
performed by Prover 1 during the course of Step 2 of Protocol 1, or more precisely, during Step 5
of Protocol 4 in the Appendix. For example if the provers attempt to collectively cheat by not
performing the required permutations, the trap qubits will be misplaced from the point of view of
the verifier, and since in the Output Message Distribution Protocol (Protocol 3) all the message
registers are one-time padded, no prover can correctly produce the expected measurement result
over the trap qubits. Therefore the verification steps will fail except in the case where the provers
can correctly guess the expected measurement results or the permutations applied, which occurs
only with exponentially small probability. Any other type of deviation, such as not performing
the correct encoding of the message register, sending the wrong measurement result during the
teleportation procedure, or incorrect preparation of the trap qubits is detected for exactly the same
reason due to the authentication property of Protocol 4.
5 Discussion
In summary we proved QMIP[k] = MIP∗[k] (k ≥ 2) based on the existence of a protocol for k-
party delegated quantum computation which is efficient, authenticated and private. Combined
with the results of [JJUW09], we get that QMIP[k] = MIP∗[k] for all k. Our proof is based on novel
techniques that give a direct simulation for a quantum interactive proof system with a classical
interactive proof system with entangled provers. These techniques may have interesting applica-
tions elsewhere, but do not appear to be directly applicable to the single prover setting; thus the
relationship between our approach and that of [JJUW09] remains an interesting question.
We have showed how to use the power of shared entanglement between provers to replace the
quantum communication in a protocol for QMIP. While the longstanding open problem regarding
the relationship between QMIP and MIP is still open, our result demonstrates that it suffices to
look at the direct relation between MIP∗ and MIP, forgetting QMIP altogether, and focusing the
question to the understanding of the power of shared entanglement.
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A Authenticated UBQC with Entangled Servers with Quantum Input and Output
In this section, we explicitly construct the full protocol for authenticated UBQC with entangled
servers with quantum input and output received and stored by Prover 1. This is a simple compo-
sition and adaptation of several protocols in [BFK09] with an extra construction (Step 3g) to deal
with the the fact that the verifier’s circuit is now public knowledge. In the Protocol 4, we assume
that at step 4, the verifier’s transformed circuit is implemented with a pattern on a brickwork
state Gn×m with measurements given as multiples of pi/4. Each qubit |ψx,y〉 ∈ Gn×m is indexed
by a column x ∈ {0, . . . , n} (column 0 consists of the input qubits and column n of the output
qubits) and a row y ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Thus each qubit is assigned: a measurement angle φx,y, a set
of X-dependencies Dx,y ⊆ [x − 1] × [m], and a set of Z-dependencies D′x,y ⊆ [x − 1] × [m] . Here,
we assume that the dependency sets Xx,y and Zx,y are obtained via the flow construction [DK06].
During the execution of the pattern, the actual measurement angle φ′x,y is a modification of φx,y
that depends on previous measurement outcomes in the following way: let sXx,y = ⊕i∈Dx,ysi be the
parity of all measurement outcomes for qubits in Xx,y and similarly, s
Z
x,y = ⊕i∈D′x,ysi be the parity
of all measurement outcomes for qubits in Zx,y. Then φ
′
x,y = (−1)s
X
x,yφx,y + s
Z
x,ypi.
Protocol 4 is a slight modification of the UBQC with entangled servers protocol which was shown
to be correct in Section 5 based on Theorem 2 in [BFK09]. The only difference is in Step 3g, where
several identity gates are added which does not affect the correctness. A simple modification in
Protocol 4 ensures that the inputs are coming from the provers, without affecting the blindness
property (Theorem 6 in [BFK09]). Finally the extra padding structure added in Step 3g allow us to
conveniently extend the proof of authentication (Theorem 7 in [BFK09]) for the case of the public
knowledge of verifier’s circuit available in a QMIP protocol.
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Protocol 4 Authenticated UBQC with Entangled Provers and Quantum Input and Output
1. Initial input of the protocol
(a) Provers 1 and 2 share
∣∣Φ+x,y〉 = 1√2(|00〉+ |11〉) for x = 1, . . . , n− 1 and y = 1, . . . ,m (n and
m are given in step 3g below).
(b) Prover 1 receives quantum input prepared following the Step 1 of Protocol 1 to be the first
column of the brickwork state in the computation. These input qubits are encoded with C
(C is some nC-qubit error-correcting code with distance dC) and 3nC qubits in eigenstates
of Pauli operators chosen uniformly at random (called trap qubits) are added to them. The
collection of these 4nC qubits are called a block. Moreover a random permutation is applied
to each block and finally a one-time pad with keys kZ0,y ∈R {0, pi/4, 2pi/4, . . . , 7pi/4} and
kX0,y ∈R {0, 1} is performed on each qubit.
(c) The permutations, the state of trap qubits and one-time pad keys are known to the verifier
and not to provers 1 and 2.
2. Verifier’s preparation with Prover 2
For each column x = 1, . . . , n− 1 and for each row y = 1, . . . ,m:
(a) The verifier chooses θ˜x,y ∈R {0, pi/4, 2pi/4, . . . , 7pi/4} and sends it to Prover 2, who measures
his part of
∣∣Φ+x,y〉 in |±θ˜x,y〉.
(b) Prover 2 sends mx,y, the outcome of his measurement, to the verifier.
3. Verifier’s authenticated preparation
(a) Convert target circuit CV to fault-tolerant circuit:
– Use error-correcting code C.
– Perform all gates and measurements fault-tolerantly.
– Some computational basis measurements are required for the fault-tolerant implementation
(for verification of ancillae and non-transversal gates). Each measurement is accomplished
by making and measuring a pseudo-copy of the target qubit: a ctrl-X is performed from
the target to an ancilla qubit initially set to |0〉, which is then measured in the Z-basis.
– Ancilla qubit wire are evenly spaced through the circuit.
– The ancillae are re-used. All ancillae are measured at the same time, at regular intervals,
after each fault-tolerant gate (some outputs may be meaningless).
(b) Within each encoded qubit, permute all wires consistent with the position of non-trap qubits
in the encoded input of Prover 1, keeping these permutations secret from Provers 1 and 2.
(c) Within each encoded qubit, add 3nT trap wires consistent with the position of trap qubits
in the encoded input of Prover 1. The trap qubit wire (at this point) does not interact with
the rest of the circuit.
(d) Trap qubits are verified using the same ancillae as above: they are rotated into the
computational basis, measured using the pseudo-copy technique above, and then returned
to their initial basis.
(e) Any fault-tolerant measurement is randomly interspersed with verification of 3nT random
trap wires. For this, identity gates are added as required.
(f) For encoded qubits with classical outputs, the trap wires of the corresponding blocks are
rotated as a last step, so that the following measurement in the computational basis is used
for a final verification.
(g) Convert the whole circuit above to a measurement-based computation on the brickwork
state, with the addition of regular Z-basis measurements corresponding to the measurements
on ancillae qubits above. Swap and identity gates are added as required, and trap qubits
are left untouched. Further identity gates are added so that for any choice of permutation
for each block, the resulting dimensions, n and m, of the brickwork states are identical and
hence dependent only on the dimensions of CV .
14
Protocol 4 — Continued
4. Verifier’s blind quantum computation with Prover 1
Taking θx,y = θ˜x,y + mx,ypi (for x = 1, . . . , n − 1 and y = 1, . . . ,m) and θ0,y = kZ0,y (for
y = 1, . . . ,m), the verifier runs the following steps to implement the authenticated measurement
pattern constructed in Step 3.
(a) The verifier periodically instructs Prover 1 to measure in Z as indicated in Step 3. These
qubits are chosen at regular spacial intervals so that no information about the structure of
the computation is revealed.
(b) Prover 1 prepares the last column of qubits |ψn,y〉 = |+〉 (y = 1, . . . ,m).
(c) Prover 1 creates an entangled state from all received qubits, according to their indices, by
applying ctrl-Z gates between the qubits in order to create a brickwork state Gn×m.
(d) For each column x = 0, . . . , n− 1 and for each row y = 1, . . . ,m:
i. Verifier computes φ′x,y with the special case φ′0,y = (−1)k
X
0,yφ0,y.
ii. The verifier chooses rx,y ∈R {0, 1} and computes δx,y = φ′x,y + θx,y + pirx,y .
iii. The verifier transmits δx,y to Prover 1.
iv. Prover 1 measures in the basis {∣∣+δx,y〉 , ∣∣−δx,y〉}.
v. Prover 1 transmits the result sx,y ∈ {0, 1} to the verifier.
vi. If rx,y = 1 above, the verifier flips sx,y; otherwise she does nothing.
(e) The last column consists of quantum outputs together with their corresponding trap qubits,
where all these qubits are one-time padded with keys known only to the verifier (Theorem 4
[BFK09]). In order to obtain a classical outcome, the verifier instructs Prover 1 to measure
the corresponding block (a quantum output together with its trap qubits). Note that the
output measurements are restricted to be in the (X,Y ) plane so that the classical outputs
will be one-time padded with keys rn−1,y known only to the verifier. However this is not a
restriction as any other arbitrary measurement can be also applied by adding the required
rotation as part of the original pattern computation. Finally also note that since trap
qubits are inserted in each block and each block is randomly permuted, only the verifier
knows the exact position of the output qubits.
5. Verifier’s verification
The verifier uses the results of the trap qubit measurements performed by Prover 1 above to
detect any deviation from the protocol. The verifier accepts only if all the results correspond
with her initial preparation of the trap qubits, otherwise she rejects.
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